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IS THERE SUFFICIENT HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 
TO ESTABLISH THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS? 
Robert Greg Cavin 
A number of Christian philosophers, most recently Gary R. Habermas and 
William Lane Craig, have claimed that there is sufficient historical evidence 
to establish the resurrection of Jesus conceived as the transformation of 
Jesus' corpse into a living supernatural body that possesses such extraordi-
nary dispositional properties as the inability to ever die again. T argue that, 
given this conception of resurrection, our only source of potential evidence, 
the New Testament Easter traditions, cannot provide adequate information 
to enable us to establish the historicity of the resurrection-even on the 
assumption that these traditions are completely historicallv reliable. 
A lively debate has taken place over the last several years (often in the 
pages of this journal) concerning the possibility of establishing the historic-
ity of the resurrection of Jesus. Although many crucial issues have been 
discussed, e.g., the reliability of the New Testament Easter traditions, other 
problems, equally important, remain too long overlooked. It is the pur-
pose of this paper to consider one of these neglected problems. I shall 
argue, in particular, that because resurrection entails the transformation of 
a corpse into a supernatural body, our only source of potential evidence, 
viz., the New Testament Easter traditions, do not provide sufficient infor-
mation to enable us to establish the historicity of the resurrection-even 
on the assumption of their complete historical reliability. 
In order to appreciate this problem it is necessary to consider two mat-
ters. First, it is necessary to consider what precisely is being claimed as 
being established by the New Testament Easter traditions by those who 
claim that these are sufficient to establish the historicity of the resurrection 
of Jesus. That is, it is necessary to consider what exactly the resurrection is 
conceived by these individuals to be and, accordingly, what kind of evi-
dence would be required to establish it. Second, it is necessary to consider 
what kind of evidence is actually afforded by the New Testament Easter 
traditions and, correlatively, what this evidence is capable of establishing. 
I shall discuss these matters in turn. 
Let us thus first examine the concept of resurrection supposed by those 
who claim that there is sufficient evidence to establish the historicity of the 
resurrection of Jesus, most notably, William Lane Craig, Gary R. 
Habermas, Murray J. Harris, George Eldon Ladd, and Wolfhart 
Pannenberg.1 According to this concept, resurrection is the transformation 
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of a corpse into a living supernatural body (soma pneumatikon)2 and, as 
such, is to be sharply distinguished from the resuscitation of a dead indi-
vidual to the ordinary, premortem state of life (e.g., Lazarus in In. 11:39-
44).' Typical here is the analysis given by Craig: 
Resurrection is not resuscitation. The mere restoration of life to a 
corpse is not a resurrection. A person who has resuscitated 
returns only to this earthly life and will die again.4 
In contrast: 
Jesus rose to eternal life in a radically transformed body that can 
be described as immortal, glorious, powerful, and supernatural. 
In this new mode of existence he was not bound by the physical 
limitations of this universe, but possessed superhuman powers.' 
This concept of resurrection, of course, comes directly from the New 
Testament where the term 'anastasis' ('resurrection') is reserved exclusively 
for that species of revivification affirmed of both Jesus on the third day and 
the dead at the end of this age--but never applied to resuscitation.6 This is 
clear from the biblical passages that are constitutive of this concept, e.g., 
the saying ascribed to Jesus in Luke 20:36: 
Those accounted worthy to attain ... the resurrection from the dead 
... cannot die any more, because they are equal to the angels ... 
and the Pauline teaching of 1 Corinthians 15:42-44b: 
So is it with the resurrection from the dead. 
What is sown is perishable, 
what is raised is imperishable. 
It is sown in dishonor, 
it is raised in glory. 
It is sown in weakness, 
it is raised in power. 
As is evident from these passages, the resurrection body on the concept 
we are examining possesses a number of quite extraordinary dispositional 
properties. Let us look briefly at those given most prominence by the indi-
viduals, noted above, who suppose this concept. It has already been 
observed, in the second quotation from Craig, that the resurrection body is 
immortal-it is impossible for it to die. Those who are resurrected, for 
example, cannot suffocate or be killed by poison, fire, or electrocution. 
Beyond mere immortality, however, which is compatible with eternity 
spent as, say, a leper or a quadriplegic, the resurrection body possesses the 
much stronger property of imperishability; i.e., as Craig, Harris, and Ladd 
have observed, it cannot suffer deterioration or deformity or, indeed, any 
kind or degree of physical indignity.? This has three important logical con-
sequences. First, it is impossible for the resurrection body to age--it can-
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not wrinkle or loose its firmness or become frail with ever increasing time.' 
Second, the resurrection body is insusceptible to all illness and disease, e.g., 
it cannot contract the common cold or AIDS, and thus enjoys absolutely 
perfect health.9 Third, the resurrection body cannot be injured in any way, 
e.g., it cannot be blinded by acid or bruised in a fall or cut by a sword or be 
otherwise disfigured or maimed.lO In addition to imperishability, finally, 
the resurrection body also possesses enormous power-in particular, as 
Ladd and Craig have observed, the power to move instantaneously from 
place to place, i.e., to vanish and reappear, at will, without regard for spa-
tial distances." Lazarus, of course, once resuscitated, would have to walk 
in order to get around; he would be doomed to continue to age, to become 
sick or injured on occasion, and to eventually die again. But this is not pos-
sible, on the concept we are examining, for one who has undergone resur-
rection from the dead. 
Now, from this brief review of the concept of resurrection held by those 
who claim that there is sufficient historical evidence to establish the resur-
rection of Jesus, it is clear that the hypothesis of the resurrection is not to be 
identified with the comparatively weak claim of revivification: 
0) Jesus died and afterwards he became alive once again. 
which is strictly neutral between the hypotheses of Jesus' resurrection and 
resuscitation. Rather, the resurrection hypothesis is logically equivalent to 
the much bolder claim: 
(2) Jesus died and afterwards he was transformed into a living 
supernatural body. 
which entails not only 0) but also the following dispositional propositions: 
(3) Jesus became no longer able to die. 
(4) Jesus became no longer able to age. 
(5) Jesus became no longer able to be sick. 
(6) Jesus became no longer able to be injured. 
(7) Jesus became able to move at will instantaneously from place 
to place. 12 
Correlatively, it is clear that those who claim that the New Testament 
Easter traditions are sufficient to establish the resurrection hypothesis are 
claiming not merely that there is sufficient evidence to establish (1) but, 
quite significantly, that this evidence is sufficient to establish the much 
stronger hypothesis (2) and, in consequence, the specific dispositional 
propositions it logically implies, viz., (3) through (7). This can be seen once 
again in the typical claims they make regarding this matter, e.g., the fol-
lowing claim by Habermas: 
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The evidence shows that the claims of the earliest eyewitnesses 
have been vindicated-Jesus' literal Resurrection from the dead 
in a glorified, spiritual body is the best explanation for the facts." 
Now that we have seen how resurrection is conceived by those who 
claim that the New Testament Easter traditions are sufficient to establish 
the resurrection of Jesus, we can begin to consider what kind of evidence is 
required to establish the resurrection hypothesis. Here it is crucial to avoid 
the mistake of those who, neglectful of this (the biblical) concept, have been 
tempted to suppose that establishing the hypothesis of the resurrection is 
merely a matter of establishing the conjunction of two singular historical 
propositions, viz.: 
(1) Jesus died and afterwards he became alive once again. 
For example, Thomas Sherlock in his classic Tryal of the Witnesses of the Res-
urrection argues that: 
A man rising from the dead is an object of sense, and can give the 
same evidence of his being alive, as any other man in the world 
can give. So that a resurrection considered only as a fact to be 
proved by evidence is a plain case: it requires no greater ability in 
the witnesses, than that they be able to distinguish between a man 
dead and a man alive; a point in which I believe every man living 
thinks himself a judge.14 
Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. The problem here is 
that Sherlock has confused the relatively weak claim of revivification (1) 
with the much bolder resurrection hypothesis: 
(2) Jesus died and afterwards he was transformed into a living 
supernatural body. 
But now, while (1) may well be established through sense perception by the 
kind of two-step procedure envisaged by Sherlock, this is quite impossible 
in the case of (2). For (2) logically implies not only (1) but dispositional 
propositions (3) through (7)-which alone distinguish it from the hypothe-
sis of Jesus' resuscitation. Accordingly, in order to establish the resurrection 
hypothesis it will also be necessary to establish these dispositional proposi-
tions. As will now be explained, however, establishing (3) through (7), in 
order to establish the hypothesis of the resurrection, requires far more than 
merely establishing singular propositions about the past. 
Dispositional propositions (3) through (7), of course, are singular propo-
sitions, containing the proper name 'Jesus.' However, these propositions 
are also, in part, universal generalizations that make very bold claims 
about the past, the present, and all times of the future. To see this note that 
(3) through (7), as logical consequences of (2), must be understood as ellip-
tical propositions that (within the limitations of our best information) make 
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implicit reference to the approximate time of the alleged events they relate, 
viz., the period from 30 to 33 CE.IS This is because (2) itself, as understood 
by those who hold that there is sufficient evidence to establish the resurrec-
tion of Jesus, is not the temporally vague claim that the resurrection 
occurred at some time or other in the past, but rather, the comparatively 
definite proposition: 
(2') Jesus was transformed into a living supernatural body some-
time, after his death, between 30 and 33 CE. 
(For example, (2) is clearly understood in the literature, despite its lack of 
explicit temporal reference, as being incompatible with a date for the resur-
rection during the time of Moses or World War II.) Thus, dispositional 
propositions (3) through (7), as logical consequences of (2), contain this 
implicit temporal reference as well. As a result, however, these proposi-
tions also consist, in part, of universal generalizations about the past, the 
present, and all times of the future. Consider, for example, dispositional 
proposition: 
(6) Jesus became no longer able to be injured. 
This asserts that Jesus became no longer able to be injured at some (unspec-
ified) time between 30 and 33 CE. and thus (in part) that immediately 
before this time Jesus was not unable to be injured whereas at all times 
after this time he has been/will be unable to be injured. Accordingly, (6) 
has as a major constituent a universal generalization about the past, the 
present, and all times of the future, viz.: 
(8) Jesus is unable to be injured at any time after 33 c.E. 
Similarly, dispositional propositions (3) through (5) and (7) have the fol-
lowing universal generalizations as major components as well: 
(9) Jesus is unable to die at any time after 33 CE. 
(10) Jesus is unable to age at any time after 33 CE. 
(11) Jesus is unable to be sick at any time after 33 CE. 
(12) Jesus is able to move at will instantaneously from place to 
place at any time after 33 CE. 
These universal generalizations, moreover, make claims of a very strong 
kind since they concern the dispositional properties of Jesus' resurrection 
body. (8), for example, does not claim that it is a mere matter of happen-
stance that at each time after 33 C£. nothing injures Jesus. Rather, it 
claims that at any such time nothing can injure Jesus-that this is a phys-
iological impossibility. It is clear, then, that very bold universal general-
izations are constituents of dispositional propositions (3) through (7) and, 
366 Faith and Philosophy 
as such, logical consequences of the resurrection hypothesis (2). 
Accordingly, in order to establish (2) it will also be necessary to establish 
these universal generalizations. 
But now consider what kind of evidence is required to establish univer-
sal generalizations (8) through (12). Let us pursue this matter by looking 
more generally at any proposition of the form: 
(13) Object s is able/unable to cfJat any time after T. 
There would seem to be only two possible ways of establishing such a 
proposition-depending upon the extent of our previous experience with 
objects of the same kind as 5. We will consider each of these and then 
apply the results to determine specifically what kind of evidence is 
required to establish universal generalizations (8) through (12). 
First consider those cases in which s is an object of a kind", of which we 
have had considerable previous experience. Here it may be possible, with-
out the need for direct testing, to establish a proposition of the form of (13) 
"from above," i.e., by deriving it as a consequence from some previously 
well-established general hypothesis of the form that links objects of kind '" 
with the permanent ability /inability to cfJ, viz.: 
(14) Objects that are'" at a given time are able/unable to cfJ at any 
time thereafter. 
The evidence we will need to accomplish this is simply the corresponding 
proposition of the form: 
(15) Object 5 is '" at time T. 
Thus, for example, suppose that a clay pot is fired in a kiln on May 14, 
1997. Then we can establish the dispositional proposition: 
(16) The clay pot is brittle at any time after May 14, 1997. 
without ever actually having to try to crack, fragment, or shatter the pot by 
simply appealing to the well-established generalization: 
(17) Clay that is fired in a kiln at a given time is brittle at any time 
thereafter. 
in conjunction with the particular observation-based proposition: 
(18) The clay pot was fired in a kiln on May 14, 1995. 
Now consider those cases in which s is the kind of object of which we 
have had little or no previous experience, so that we lack generalizations 
regarding the properties of objects of this kind. Here it will be necessary 
to establish a proposition of the form of (13) "from below," i.e., by gather-
ing information about 5 that directly tests it for the ability /inability to cfJ at 
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any time after 'T. Suppose, for example, that an old tree stump, found 
soaking in a vat of some unknown fluid labeled "E.K.S.," retains this sub-
stance, but in solidified form, after its removal from the vat. Then, since, 
ex hypothesi, we have no generalizations regarding the behavior of wood 
saturated with substance E.K.S., it will be necessary in order to establish 
one or the other of the following dispositional hypotheses: 
(19) The stump is flammable at any time after its removal from 
the vat. 
(20) The stump is nonflammable at any time after its removal 
from the vat. 
to directly test the shImp to see whether it in fact burns. It is crucial, howev-
er, not only in this case, but again, in any case generally, that our evidence 
concerning object s constitute a genuine test of its ability/inability to cf> at any 
time after To Indeed, it is an acknowledged principle of inductive logic that 
such a test must provide a considerable number of independent instances 
(propositions based ultimately upon observation) acquired over a long peri-
od of time in which s does/ does not cf>under a wide variety of circumstances 
in which cp-ing occurs. To see this, consider, for example, what kind of evi-
dence would be required to establish proposition (20), whose negative form 
makes this requirement particularly acute. It will not do, clearly, even to 
have a large number of observations made at various times that merely yield 
the information that the stump is not on fire.16 The problem, of course, is that 
this information does not tell us whether the stump has been exposed to con-
ditions that cause combustion on these occasions and, thus, cannot minimize 
the probability that it has not-that the stump is actually flammable at these 
times. What a genuine test of (20) must do, accordingly, is minimize this 
probability by providing evidence in which the stump fails to burn even 
though it is exposed to considerable heat (e.g., by being placed in a flame) 
while in the presence of oxygen. Moreover, such observations must be made 
under a wide variety of circumstances conducive to combustion in order to 
minimize the still remaining probability that our evidence (instances in 
which the stump is not on fire under conditions that cause combustion) is 
due merely to coincidence or some unsuspected transient factor, e.g., an 
undetected electric field that, only when present, creates a rearrangement of 
the molecules of E.K.S. within the wood fibers that prevents their reaction 
with oxygen to produce combustion. Finally, since the stump is being tested 
for permanent nonflammability, it is also necessary to gather our items of evi-
dence, not just at a few times that occur fairly close together, but rather, over 
a large number of times that are spread far apart. The upshot of this discus-
sion, then, is that in order to establish universal generalizations of the form of 
(13) "from below" it will be necessary (and indeed sufficient) to have as evi-
dence a large number of independent instances acquired over a relatively 
long period of time in which object s is exposed to a wide variety of condi-
tions that cause cp-ing and yet does/ does not cf>. 
In light of this general background we can now see specifically what 
kind of evidence is required to establish universal generalizations (8) 
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through (2). Consider first what would be required to establish these 
propositions "from above." The task here, again, is to avoid the need for 
directly testing propositions (8) through (2) by deriving them from some 
well-established generalization of the form: 
(21) Individuals who are'" at a given time are unable to cP at any 
time thereafter. 
that links individuals of kind '" with the permanent inability to cP, i.e., to 
die, to age, etc. To accomplish this, accordingly, we will need as our evi-
dence the corresponding singular proposition of the form: 
(22) Jesus was an individual of kind", sometime between 30 and 
33 CE. 
For example, it might be possible to use the historical proposition: 
(23) Jesus was executed for claiming to be the Son of God and 
then revivified in vindication of that claim sometime 
between 30 and 33 CE. 
in conjunction with the generalization: 
(24) Anyone who at a given time is executed for claiming to be 
the Son of God and then revivified in vindication of that 
claim is unable to be sick at any time thereafter. 
to establish: 
(1) Jesus is unable to be sick at any time after 33 CE. 
We could do this, of course, provided that (23) is among the items of evi-
dence we have at our disposal and that (24) is a well-established general 
hypothesis. Propositions (8) through (0) and (2) could be established 
"from above" in this same way. 
Next consider what would be required to establish universal generaliza-
tions (8) through (2) "from below." As is clear from our earlier discus-
sion, here we will need as our evidence a large number of independent 
instances gathered over a relatively long period of time in which Jesus is 
placed under and passes a wide variety of genuine tests of the disposition-
al properties posited in these propositions. Thus, for example, consider: 
(8) Jesus is unable to be injured at any time after 33 CE. 
This is a generalization of staggering proportions! It implies such things 
as, for example, that Jesus can never be blinded by acid, that he can never 
be bruised by stones, that he can never be poisoned by snake venom, that 
he can never be pierced by a speeding bullet, that he can never break his 
arm falling off the tallest skyscraper, and that he can never be so much as 
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even singed by the blast of a hundred-thousand megaton hydrogen bomb! 
To establish (8) "from below," accordingly, it will be insufficient to merely 
adduce as evidence a proposition like: 
(25) Jesus had no injury on a small number of occasions (about a 
dozen) that occurred during a brief period of time (forty days) 
after his revivification, sometime between 30 and 33 CE. 
The problem, of course, is that (25) omits several crucial items information 
that are essential for establishing (8), viz., whether the revivified Jesus was 
actually subjected to injurious agents at the times to which it refers, what 
kinds of agents (if any) these were, what the attending circumstances were 
on these occasions, etc. As a result, (25) makes (8) no more probable than it 
does obvious competing hypotheses, in particular, that Jesus (like Lazarus) 
was merely resuscitated and just happened to avoid injury during the brief 
period of time he was observed, that Jesus was able to withstand only cer-
tain injurious agents, that Jesus' ability to withstand injury was only tem-
porary (due to some special transient factor), etc. Accordingly, in order to 
minimize the probability of these alternatives and thus establish universal 
generalization (8) "from below," it will be necessary to have as our evi-
dence the much stronger proposition: 
(26) Jesus was subjected to a wide variety of injurious agents 
(e.g., the scourge, hydrochloric acid, cyanide capsules, etc.) 
under various conditions (e.g., the absence of air, tempera-
tures below -320.5° F) on a large number of independent 
occasions between 30 and 1996 CB. and suffered no injury at 
any of them. 
Propositions (9) through (2) will have to be established "from below" in 
essentially the same way. It must be emphasized, however, in the case of: 
(0) Jesus is unable to age at any time after 33 CE. 
that it will be necessary to amass our evidence over a very long period of 
time-years if not centuries or even millennia-since this is the only way 
to detect signs of the aging process (e.g., increasing wrinkling of skin, gray-
ing and loss of hair, advancement of Alzheimer's Disease, rheumatoid 
arthritis, etc.) It is also necessary to note in the case of: 
(12) Jesus is able to move at will instantaneously from place to 
place at any time after 33 CE. 
that we will need numerous instances in which Jesus specifically wills to 
move instantaneously from one place to another and actually succeeds in 
doing so. 
Let us now turn to the putative historical evidence we actually have for 
the resurrection hypothesis. This consists entirely of biblical traditions that 
come from the letters of Paul, the Gospels, and the book of Acts. These doc-
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uments report a number of appearances of what is alleged to be Jesus in his 
resurrection body: eleven appearances on earth (to Mary Magdalene, Peter, 
et al.) during the forty day period that began on the first Easter and one 
heavenly appearance (to Paul) approximately three years laterY Let us 
grant-but merely for the sake of argument-that the New Testament 
Easter traditions are entirely historical, down to the last detaiU8 Then we 
may state these traditions in one compendious proposition as follows: 
(27) Jesus died and became alive again sometime between 30 and 
33 c.E. On eleven occasions, during the next forty days, he 
presented himself alive before various individuals and 
groups-doing such things as walking, teaching, eating, etc. 
He had no illness or injury (other than what he suffered in 
connection with his crucifixion) at any of these times. On 
two of them he moved instantaneously from place to place--
vanishing from the house in Emmaus and appearing later in 
the Upper Room. On another occasion he walked through 
the closed doors into the Upper Room. Finally, at the end of 
his last appearance, he ascended from the Mount of Olives 
into a cloud waiting overhead. Sometime, about three years 
later, Jesus appeared on the road to Damascus to Saul of 
Tarsus and his traveling companions in the form of a heav-
enly light and voice/noise claiming to have undergone res-
urrection from the dead. 
Details not explicitly stated in this proposition, e.g., that Jesus appeared to 
Mary Magdalene and the other Mary on their way from the empty tomb 
(Mt. 28:8-10), are nonetheless tacitly assumed. 
Let us now consider, finally, what the New Testament Easter traditions, 
as stated in (27), are actually capable of establishing. Taking (27) as our 
evidence for the resurrection hypothesis, even for the sake of argument, is 
clearly going far beyond "the second mile." After all, (27) even assumes 
the revivification hypothesis (1) as a fact(!). Nonetheless, even if we waive 
all critical doubt regarding the historical reliability of (27), it is clear that 
this "evidence" still cannot be used to establish universal generalizations 
(8) through (12)-either "from above" or "from below." 
It is clear, first, that we cannot use (27) to establish universal generaliza-
tions (8) through (12) "from above." The problem here is that there are no 
well-established general hypotheses that link the putative evidence we have 
about Jesus in (27) with the dispositional properties of the resurrection 
body (e.g., the permanent inability to die) posited in universal generaliza-
tions (8) through (12). For example, we have no well-established general-
izations about the properties of revivified individuals, e.g.: 
(24) Anyone who at a given time is executed for claiming to be 
the Son of God and then revivified in vindication of that 
claim is unable to be sick at any time thereafter. 
because, clearly, we have no experience with revivified persons (especially 
EVIDENCE FOR THE RESURRECTTON 371 1 
those claiming to be the Son of God) upon which to base such generaliza-
tions. It may be objected that we do have eyewitness reports concerning 
such individuals, viz., those recorded in the biblical accounts of revivifica-
tion (2 Kg. 4:32-35; 13:21; Mt. 9:25; 27:52-53; Lk. 7:12-15; In. 11:43-44; Acts 
9:36-41; 20:9-10). However, these stories, in addition to being of dubious 
historical value, involve only cases of resuscitation. Thus, even if historical, 
they would actually tend to support the following generalization: 
(28) Anyone who has been revivified at a given time is able to 
die, to be injured, etc., at any time thereafter. 
and thus, ironically, lead us to the contraries of propositions (8) through 
(12)! And this is the situation quite generally: We lack the requisite experi-
ence necessary for establishing general hypotheses that would link the 
information we have about Jesus with the dispositional properties of the 
resurrection body. 
It is also clear that we cannot establish propositions (8) through (12) 
"from below," by directly testing them against the putative evidence 
offered in (27). The problem here, simply, is that the appearances of the 
revivified Jesus adduced in (27) do not constitute an adequate sample upon 
which to base universal generalizations of such immense scope. This is evi-
dent, on the one hand, in the case of the earthly appearances of the revivi-
fied Jesus. These are very few (only eleven) in number, occur within a very 
brief period of time (only forty days), and, worst of all, do not involve gen-
uine tests of the dispositional properties of the resurrection body. Thus, 
Jesus is never exposed to objects that can injure (e.g., a mace), disease pro-
ducing agents (e.g., Plasmodium malariae), or lethal substances (e.g., mustard 
gas), etc. (This is hardly surprising, of course, since his followers would 
never dare commit such sacrilege as, e.g., setting Jesus' clothes on fire in 
order to see whether he would burn!) Furthermore, Jesus is only observed 
during a six week period in these appearances-making detection of the 
aging process impossible. Finally, in the Emmaus and first Upper Room 
appearances Jesus does not even will (at least overtly) to teleport. Nor, on 
the other hand, does the heavenly appearance to Paul on the road to 
Damascus add anything appreciable to our evidence. For all that was actu-
ally observed on this occasion was a blinding light-not the body of Jesus 
itself.'9 Hence, Paul was not in a position to determine whether Jesus could 
still be injured, killed, etc. Moreover, there were no further appearances of 
the revivified Jesus. 20 Accordingly, we have no observations of the actual 
body of Jesus from the time of the ascension until the present. Thus we 
have no evidence that Jesus didn't catch a bad cold in 43 CE. or that he did-
n't cut himself on a rock one hundred years later. We have no evidence that 
he didn't succumb to gangrene or a blow to the head in 503 CE. or that he 
wasn't shriveled with old age in the year 1200 CE. Nor do we have evi-
dence regarding the ability of Jesus to move instantaneously from place to 
place at any of these times. Consequently, the incidents adduced in (27) can 
no more establish universal generalizations (8) through (12) than could par-
allel observations (e.g., made by the townspeople of Bethany) establish: 
(29) Lazarus was transformed into a living supernatural body on 
372 Faith and Philosophy 
the fourth day after his death by Jesus. 
They perhaps offer (12) a scintilla of support-but that is all. 
The upshot of this discussion, then, is this. In light of the kind of evi-
dence required to establish universal generalizations either "from above" 
or "from below," the putative evidence we actually have from the New 
Testament Easter traditions (proposition (27» is far too weak to establish 
the distinctive consequences of the resurrection hypothesis: 
(8) Jesus is unable to be injured at any time after 33 CE. 
(9) Jesus is unable to die at any time after 33 CE. 
(10) Jesus is unable to age at any time after 33 CE. 
(11) Jesus is unable to be sick at any time after 33 CE. 
(12) Jesus is able to move at will instantaneously from place to 
place at any time after 33 CE. 
However, since the resurrection hypothesis entails universal generaliza-
tions (8) through (12), it is necessary to establish these propositions in order 
to establish the resurrection hypothesis. Consequently, it must be conclud-
ed that the putative evidence afforded by the New Testament Easter tradi-
tions fails to establish the resurrection hypothesis. This conclusion, of 
course, applies a fortiori to the bona fide evidence we have for the resurrec-
tion hypothesis-what Habermas has called "the known historical facts" 
of the case-e.g., the basic empty tomb tradition (Mk. 16:1-6,8) and the 
appearance list given by Paul (1 Cor. 15:3-8).21 
I think there are two likely objections to my argument that the New 
Testament Easter traditions do not provide sufficient evidence to establish 
the resurrection hypothesis. First, and most obviously, it may be objected 
that the ability of the revivified Jesus (as granted in (27» to appear / disap-
pear and to pass through solid objects signifies a change in the nature of 
his body most congruent with the supposition that he could no longer be 
injured, die, etc. The intuition here is that a body capable of teleportation 
and/ or passage through solid matter must have undergone a remarkable 
change incommensurate with all forms of physical corruptibility. 
Accordingly, it may be argued that (27) does provide evidence at least for 
universal generalizations (8) through (11). 
But this objection is without foundation. Upon closer examination, it 
proves to be an attempt to establish propositions (8) through (11) "from 
above" by appeal to (27) in conjunction with the following implicitly 
assumed generalization: 
(30) Any revivified person who can move instantaneously from 
place to place or pass through solid objects at a given time is 
unable thereafter to be injured, to die, to age, or to be sick. 
The problem, however, is that this generalization is just an assumption and 
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thus incapable of providing the epistemic link required for the relevant 
items of (27) to confer evidence upon universal generalizations (8) through 
(11). On the one hand, (30) is not true on conceptual grounds, for there are 
numerous conceptually possible cases in which it is false, e.g., the case in 
which the resuscitated Lazarus is directly teleported by God out of the 
tomb.22 Nor, on the other hand, is there any evidence for (30)-we have 
no instances of revivified individuals who can move instantaneously from 
place to place or pass through solid objects (other than the very case in 
question) and thus have no way of determining what such individuals are 
incapable of, e.g., dying, aging, etc. Moreover, there are at least some intu-
itive grounds for holding that (30) is actually false, since teleportation and 
passage through solid objects would surely seem to require the expendi-
ture of tremendous amounts of energy-energy that would no longer be 
available for use by a revivified body to maintain itself in homeostasis over 
against physico-chemical equilibrium with its environment. 23 
Consequently, the appeal to proposition (27) in conjunction with supposi-
tion (30), far from providing evidence for universal generalizations (8) 
through (11), merely pushes the problem of evidence one step further back. 
A second natural objection to my argument that there is insufficient evi-
dence to establish the resurrection hypothesis can be summarized as follows. 
The revivified Jesus (as supposed in (27)) was either a liar, himself deceived, 
or else telling the truth regarding his resurrection. But, clearly, Jesus wasn't 
a liar- we know this already even from his earthly life. Nor could Jesus 
have been deceived about the fact of his resurrection. His ascension and 
later appearance in heavenly glory preclude this and show that he would 
have had to have known what had happened to him, for God would not 
allow an individual in such circumstances to be deceived. Consequently, the 
revivified Jesus must have been telling the truth about his resurrection, i.e., 
what he actually underwent was resurrection, not resuscitation. 
This objection, like the first, is also an attempt to establish propositions 
(8) through (12) "from above" by appeal to the relevant items of (27) in 
conjunction with certain implicit generalizations-in this case: 
(31) Revivified persons who have been great moral teachers are 
unable to lie. 
(32) Revivified persons who have ascended and appeared in 
heavenly glory cannot be deceived regarding their species of 
revivification, i.e., whether they have undergone resuscita-
tion or resurrection. 
Once again, however, this objection will not withstand scrutiny. The prob-
lem here, as before, is that the generalizations presupposed in the objection 
are pure speculation and thus cannot furnish the necessary evidential con-
nection between (27) and propositions (8) through (12). It is clear, in the 
first place, that neither (31) nor (32) can be shown to be true by appeal to 
conceptual considerations. For example, it is conceptually possible that a 
very powerful evil spirit (e.g., one of the Watchers of the pseudepigraphic 
book of Enoch24 ) or a group of technologically advanced but unscrupulous 
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aliens (e.g., the Talosians of Star Trek25 ) brought about the resuscitation, 
ascension, and glorious appearance of Jesus-either forcing him against his 
will to lie about the resurrection or else tricking him into believing that it 
had actually occurred by enthroning him, after his ascension, in a fake heav-
en as the "resurrected" Son of Man. This is conceptually possible, note, 
even on the Christian conception of God, according to which God is of such 
a nature as to permit the occurrence of major theological deception, e.g., 
false signs and wonders capable of misleading even the elecU6 But that this 
is at least conceptually possible shows that (31) and (32) cannot be true on 
concephlal grounds.27 Accordingly, if these generalizations are to be shown 
to be true at all, it must be by appeal to experience. Unfortunately, howev-
er, we have no real empirical evidence for either of these generalizations, 
i.e., we have no instances (other than the assumed case in question) of great 
revivified moral teachers who have ascended from the earth and then 
appeared to others in blinding heavenly glory.28 As a result, we have no 
way of determining whether such individuals are peerlessly honest or 
pathological liars or whether they are accurately informed or utterly 
deceived. There is simply no way to determine the probability of what God 
would allow/disallow in such cases. The upshot, accordingly, is that the 
claims of the revivified Jesus regarding his resurrection in (27) cannot fur-
nish evidence for universal generalizations (8) through (12). 
This brings us to the end of our discussion. We have considered the 
claim that there is sufficient historical evidence to establish the resurrection 
hypothesis, viz., the hypothesis that sometime, after his death, between 30 
and 33 CE., Jesus was transformed into a living supernatural body perma-
nently incapable of death, aging, etc. Upon careful examination, however, 
we have found that our only source of potential evidence, the New 
Testament Easter traditions, fall far short of providing the kind of informa-
tion necessary for establishing the resurrection hypothesis-even on the 
assumption of their complete historical reliability (proposition (27)). This 
assumption, of course, is rightly dismissed in light of contemporary New 
Testament scholarship (particularly in the case of those traditions that 
recount the disappearance/ appearance of the revivified Jesus [Lk. 
24:31,36], his walking through closed doors Dn. 20:19,26], and his ascension 
from the Mount of Olives [Acts 1:91.)29 It has served, nonetheless, to dra-
matically highlight the ultimate point of this discussion, viz., that the tiny 
fraction of New Testament Easter traditions that comprises our bOlla fide 
historical evidence-the core empty tomb tradition (Mk. 16:1-6,8) and the 
appearance list given by Paul (1 Cor. 15:3-8)-is woefully inadequate to 
establish a proposition as bold as the resurrection hypothesis. 3D It also 
serves to rebut the charge, so often leveled by apologists, that the reason 
critics find evidence wanting for the resurrection is because of overly zeal-
ous skepticism toward the New Testament Easter traditions coupled with 
the a priori rejection of the supernaturaP For the real problem, we have 
seen, is one of logic-not metaphysics. Things would be different, of 
course, if had we eyewitness reports of the revivified Jesus passing gen-
uine tests of the dispositional properties of the resurrection body, e.g., the 
statement of Peter and John that they saw Roman lances bouncing off the 
body of the revivified Jesus as he stormed the Praetorium to unseat Pilate 
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and take his rightful place as Messiah. But, unfortunately, we do not. 
Consequently, apologists would do well to stop making exalted claims 
about establishing the resurrection and turn their attention instead to the 
revivification hypothesis. But there are serious logical problems here too 
that await future discussion.32 
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False Christs and false prophets will arise and show great signs and 
wonders, so as to lead astray, if possible, even the elect. (Mt. 24:24) 
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